[1]宋文洁,詹朝曦.水环境治理PPP项目的多主体行为演化博弈[J].华侨大学学报(自然科学版),2023,44(2):233-242.[doi:10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.202212004]
　SONG Wenjie,ZHAN Zhaoxi.Multi-Agent Behavior Evolutionary Game of Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects[J].Journal of Huaqiao University(Natural Science),2023,44(2):233-242.[doi:10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.202212004]
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水环境治理PPP项目的多主体行为演化博弈()
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《华侨大学学报（自然科学版）》[ISSN:1000-5013/CN:35-1079/N]

卷:
第44卷
期数:
2023年第2期
页码:
233-242
栏目:
出版日期:
2023-03-14

文章信息/Info

Title:
Multi-Agent Behavior Evolutionary Game of Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects
文章编号:
1000-5013(2023)02-0233-10
作者:
宋文洁;  詹朝曦
华侨大学 土木工程学院, 福建 厦门 361021
Author(s):
SONG Wenjie;  ZHAN Zhaoxi
College of Civil Engineering, Huaqiao University, Xiamen 361021, China
关键词:
水环境治理;  PPP模式;  演化博弈;  利益相关者;  政府规制
Keywords:
water environment treatment;  PPP model;  evolutionary game;  stakeholders;  government regulation
分类号:
X522
DOI:
10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.202212004
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
基于水环境治理PPP项目多主体不同策略组合下的收益函数,构建政府主体、经济主体和社会主体多主体演化博弈模型,并通过MATLAB软件进行数值模拟和参数敏感性分析.结果表明:在一定条件下复制动态系统可以达到积极规制,自主推进,主动参与的理想稳定状态;激励措施可以加快自主推进、主动参与策略收敛速度,但激励强度并非越强越好;演化稳定策略受惩罚力度和损失系数γ影响,对损失系数β不敏感.
Abstract:
Based on the income function of water environment treatment PPP projects under different strategy combinations of multi-agent, a multi-agent evolutionary game model was established among government agent, economic agent and social agent, and numerical simulation and parameter sensitivity analysis were carried out by MATLAB software. The results show that the replication dynamic system can achieve the ideal stable state of active regulation, independent promotion and active participation under certain conditions. The incentive measures can accelerate convergence speed of autonomous promotion and active participation strategies, but the incentive intensity is not as better as it gets stronger. The evolution stability strategy is affected by penalty intensity and loss coefficient γ, but it isn’t insensitive to loss coefficient β.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期: 2022-12-29
通信作者: 詹朝曦(1970-),男,副教授,博士,主要从事建筑经济、工程管理的研究.E-mail:75963701@qq.com.
基金项目: 国家社科基金一般资助项目(21BZZ069); 福建省软科学创新战略研究项目(2021R0056)
更新日期/Last Update: 2023-03-20