[1]侯银银,陈金龙.银企信用关系良性演化的机理研究[J].华侨大学学报(自然科学版),2012,33(5):573-580.[doi:10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.2012.05.0573]
　HOU Yin-yin,CHEN Jin-long.Mechanism of Benign Evolution of the Credit Relationship Between Banks and Enterprises[J].Journal of Huaqiao University(Natural Science),2012,33(5):573-580.[doi:10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.2012.05.0573]
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银企信用关系良性演化的机理研究()
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《华侨大学学报（自然科学版）》[ISSN:1000-5013/CN:35-1079/N]

卷:
第33卷
期数:
2012年第5期
页码:
573-580
栏目:
出版日期:
2012-09-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Mechanism of Benign Evolution of the Credit Relationship Between Banks and Enterprises
文章编号:
1000-5013(2012)05-0573-08
作者:
侯银银;  陈金龙
华侨大学 工商管理学院, 福建 泉州 362021
Author(s):
HOU Yin-yin;  CHEN Jin-long
College of Business Administration, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362021, China
关键词:
信用关系;  演化博弈;  信贷市场;  演化机理
Keywords:
credit relations;  evolutionary game;  credit markets;  evolution mechanism
分类号:
O225;F832.42
DOI:
10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.2012.05.0573
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
以企业和银行两个群体为研究对象,在有限理性假设基础上,通过建立演化博弈模型来分析银企信用关系的演化过程,并通过博弈复制动态方程得出演化稳定策略.即系统收敛于两种状态:一种较为理想的银企信用关系良性演化状态,另一种是不良的银企互不合作的锁定状态.从履约能力、履约意愿和银行净收益3个方面,对影响演化趋势的各参数进行分析调整和模型改进,从理论上证明有效地引导银企信用关系向良性方向演进的可行性.
Abstract:
Taking bank and enterprise as an object of study, on the basis of the limited rational hypothesis, the evolutionary process of band-enterprise credit relation has been analysed, in this article, by establishing a theoradical modal of evolutionary game. With a dynamic equation of game coping we got an evolutionary stable form the two states of the system in convergence: one is a comparatively ideal evolution process of bank-enterprise credit relation; the other the harmful locked state between bank and enterprise. Then through adjusting and improving the different parameters of the modal, which may influence the evolutionary direction, from the three espects of ability, willingness of perfoming contract and the net income of bank, the possibility of leading the credit relation between bank and enterprise to a positive way has been proved in theory.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期: 2012-01-05
通信作者: 陈金龙(1965-),男,教授,主要从事公司财务和金融创新的研究.E-mail:jinlong@hqu.edu.cn.
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573033)
更新日期/Last Update: 2012-09-20