[1]杜杨,丰景春.考虑风险偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型及其在PPP项目中的数值求解[J].华侨大学学报(自然科学版),2015,36(4):472-477.[doi:10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.2015.04.0472]
　DU Yang,FENG Jing-chun.Stackelberg Game Model with Risk Preference and Numerical Solving in the PPP Project Problem[J].Journal of Huaqiao University(Natural Science),2015,36(4):472-477.[doi:10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.2015.04.0472]
点击复制

考虑风险偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型及其在PPP项目中的数值求解()
分享到：

《华侨大学学报（自然科学版）》[ISSN:1000-5013/CN:35-1079/N]

卷:
第36卷
期数:
2015年第4期
页码:
472-477
栏目:
出版日期:
2015-07-15

文章信息/Info

Title:
Stackelberg Game Model with Risk Preference and Numerical Solving in the PPP Project Problem
文章编号:
1000-5013(2015)04-0472-06
作者:
杜杨1; 2;  丰景春1
1. 河海大学 商学院, 江苏 南京 211100;2. 金陵科技学院 建筑工程学院, 江苏 南京 211169
Author(s):
DU Yang1; 2;  FENG Jing-chun1
1. Business School, Hehai University, Nanjing 211100, China; 2. Architectural Engineering Institute, Jinling Institute of Technology, Nanjing 210098, China
关键词:
Stackelberg博弈模型;  风险偏好;  公私合作制项目;  政府补偿;  决策分析
Keywords:
stackelberg game model;  risk preference;  public-private partnerships project;  government compensation;  decision analysis
分类号:
C931;O29
DOI:
10.11830/ISSN.1000-5013.2015.04.0472
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
研究考虑风险偏好的Stackelberg博弈模型和均衡策略,针对公私合作制(PPP)项目补偿决策问题,根据前后补偿的特点,建立相应的补偿策略数学模型.分别进行集中决策和分散决策分析,得出PPP项目的最优补偿方案.通过数值分析比较和分析私人风险厌恶对于PPP补偿机制的影响.研究表明:私人投资者风险厌恶会导致政府方补偿成本增加,期望收益减少;私人投资者风险厌恶程度会影响补偿的配置方式,厌恶程度越低越倾向单一补偿,厌恶程度越高越倾向混合补偿.
Abstract:
Based on the game theory and risk preference, the Stackelberg game model and equilibrium strategy are established on decision-making problem for government compensation in public-private partnerships(PPP)project. After centralization and decentralization decision analysis, the optimal plan is obtained. Research results show that the compensation cost and the optimal scale of investment considering the risk preference are more than the risk-neutral hypothesis and the effects on the government’s expected revenue are contrary. The research results also show the degree of the private’s risk-aversion will affect the configuration mode of the government compensation.

参考文献/References:

[1] MASON S P,BALDWIN C Y.Evaluation of government subsidies to large-scale energy projects: A contingent claims approach[J].Advances in Futures and Options Research,1988,33(1):169-181.
[2] HO S P,LIU L Y.An option pricing-based model for evaluating the financial viability of privatized infrastructure projects[J].Construction Management and Economics,2002,20(2):143-156.
[3] 李明顺,陈涛,滕敏.交通基础设施PPP项目实物期权定价及敏感性分析[J].系统工程,2011,29(3):67-73.
[4] 郭健.公路基础设施PPP项目交通量风险分担策略研究[J].管理评论,2013,25(7):11-19,37.
[5] CHEAH C,LIU Ji-cai.Valuing governmental support in infrastructure projects as real options using Monte Carlo simulation[J].Construction Management and Economics,2006,24(5):545-554.
[6] JUN J.Appraisal of combined agreements in BOT project finance: Focused on minimum revenue guarantee and revenue capagreements[J].International Journal of Strategic Property Management,2010,14(2):139-155.
[7] WIBOWO A.Valuing guarantees in a BOT infrastructure project[J].Engineering,Construction and Architectural Management,2004,11(6):395-403.
[8] FEARNLEY N,BEKKEN J T,NORHEIM B.Optimal performance-based subsidies in Norwegian intercity rail transport[J].International Journal of Transport Management,2004,2(1):29-38.
[9] 邓小鹏,熊伟,袁竞峰,等.基于各方满意的PPP项目动态调价与补贴模型及实证研究[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2009,39(6):1252-1257.
[10] CHOWDHRURY A N,CHAROENNGAM C.Factors influencing finance on PPP projects in Asia: A legal framework to reach the goal[J].International Journal of Project Management,2009,27(1):51-58.
[11] 吴孝灵,周晶,彭以忱,等.基于公私博弈的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(增刊1):198-204.
[12] 刘明.中国公共资金边际成本估量与分析[J].财经论丛,2009(6):31-38.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期: 2015-06-16
通信作者: 丰景春(1963-),男,教授,博士,主要从事工程管理和项目管理及其信息化方面的研究.E-mail:feng.jingchun@163.com.
基金项目: 国家社科基金重点资助项目(14AZD024); 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2014B09014); 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2014M551498)
更新日期/Last Update: 2015-07-20